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ABSTRACT 
In view of the growing attention paid to the role of fiscal governance 
in budgetary outcomes, this paper tries to shed light on the link 
between the recent  Greek fiscal crisis and aspects of fiscal 
governance. It reviews fiscal developments in Greece over the last 
decade and challenges the widely held view that optimistic 
macroeconomic forecasts adopted by the Greek government, as well 
as three international organisations, were responsible for unrealistic 
fiscal deficit forecasts. Instead, the weak domestic institutional 
budget framework and the ineffectiveness of international 
organizations to act as signaling mechanisms emerge as the main 
reasons for weak fiscal performance. In this light, the paper puts 
forward some ideas for improving the domestic institutional 
framework for conducting fiscal policy in Greece.  
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The Greek Fiscal Crisis and the Role of Fiscal Governance 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Persistent fiscal deficits and higher levels of public debt seem to be common 
features among many OECD countries since the early 1970s (OECD, 2007a). 
Fiscal deficits, once small and controlled in most of such countries, have soared 
after the outbreak of the recent global financial crisis, as a result of both the 
direct fiscal costs of bank and other enterprise rescue operations and of 
government policies aimed at sustaining domestic demand within an 
environment of rapidly weakening economic activity (van Riet, 2010). In a 
number of countries, including Greece, the deterioration of the fiscal outlook 
has been so severe, that the financial markets’ reaction to the perceived threat 
in fiscal sustainability, has brought the cost of financing for these countries to 
prohibitive levels. One of the factors that have with little doubt intensified the 
fiscal impact of the financial crisis has been the failure of governments to take 
advantage of the good times preceding the crisis to consolidate public finances. 
In this light, an increasing number of both theoretical and empirical studies 
tries to explain the persistence of fiscal deficits even in favorable 
macroeconomic conditions (the well-known deficit bias problem) on the one 
hand and to find effective ways to ensure fiscal discipline on the other.  
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An exploration of the deficit bias phenomenon is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but several explanations have been put forward by political economy 
and public finance theorists (see for example, Shepsle and Weingast (1981), 
Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2007) and (2010), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), 
Rogoff (1990), Persson and Svensson (1989), von Hagen (2010)).  As far as the 
urging policy question on how fiscal discipline can be effectively ensured is 
concerned, attention is growingly shifting towards the importance of fiscal 
governance for budgetary outcomes. Fiscal governance is perceived as the set 
of fiscal institutional arrangements governing the conduct of fiscal policy in a 
country. Such institutional arrangements include, for example, legally binding 
fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks, budgetary procedures and the 
establishment of independent fiscal authorities (European Commission 2009a, 
OECD (2007b), Pretorius and Pretorius (2008), Alesina et al (1996), Ayuso-i-
Casals (2010)).  
Furthermore, the strengthening of fiscal governance at a national level has 
recently received particular attention in view of the difficulties to effectively 
enforce the fiscal rules set at the European level by the Stability and Growth 
Pact (European Commission, 2010b). Despite the empirical difficulty in 
measuring the quality of institutions, a large number of studies has attempted to 
establish an empirical link between institutions, budgetary processes and 
budgetary outcomes, see for example European Commission (2007), Ayuso-i-
Casals et al. (2007), von Hagen et al. (2009), von Hagen (2010), IMF (2009), 
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Calmfors (2005), Debrun and Kumar (2007), Larch and Turrini (2008).1 Each 
paper explores a different aspect of the quality of fiscal governance and its 
possible link with fiscal outcomes, but on the basis of the empirical evidence 
one could argue that on the whole budget processes and fiscal rules do matter 
for the outcome of fiscal policy. 
Against this background, the example of Greece is particularly interesting.  It is 
true that Greece has been living with a high public debt for a long period of 
time.  In the 1990s, in its effort to join the EMU, the government made a major 
effort to reduce fiscal deficits and control the rise of public debt, and succeeded 
in fulfilling the criteria for becoming member of the Euro area. Unfortunately, 
this effort was not continued in the following years, and with the turmoil of the 
international markets after the recent economic crisis, Greece found itself in the 
brink of a financial collapse. At the same time, the country appears so far to 
have scored low in almost any evaluation regarding different aspects of the 
quality of fiscal governance (European Commission, 2007, OECD, 2002, for a 
review see Rapanos, 2007) and has long been criticised on these grounds (IMF, 
2006, OECD, 2008, Vraniali, 2010).   
The questions that arise for Greece are particularly acute. What were the 
underlying causes for the severe fiscal crisis that emerged about a year ago? 
What was the link between existing budget institutions and the persistence of 
fiscal deficits, especially in the period after Greece became a euro area 
                                                 
1
 A recent strand of literature studies the impact of fiscal institutions on government bond yields (see, 
for example, Hallerberg and Wolff, 2008, Iara and Wolff, 2010), but this issue is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
  4 
member? The purpose of the paper is to explore the link between aspects of 
fiscal governance and budgetary outcomes in the case of Greece and draw 
some conclusions regarding the underlying causes of the inability of Greek 
fiscal institutions (namely the Ministry of Finance, the government and the 
Parliament) to check on the apparently uncontrollable persistence of deficits 
and the increase in public debt. More precisely, the paper focuses on the 
magnitude of deviations of budgetary outcomes from the targets set at a central 
and general government level. There is a widely held view that in many EU 
countries politically motivated systematic optimism concerning economic 
growth played a potentially significant role in generating excessive deficits 
(Jonung and Larch, 2004 and 2006).2 A similar argument has been put forward 
for Greece (IMF, 2006, Vraniali, 2010). We challenge this view for the Greek 
case and argue that the weak institutional framework for setting up and 
following the execution of the budget, as well as the ineffectiveness of 
international organisations to play a signalling role, are the key factors behind 
Greece’s fiscal derailment. In this respect, we set out some ideas on possible 
directions of reform of the domestic institutional framework and briefly 
evaluate some recent initiatives of the Greek government regarding the setting 
up of a Parliamentary Budget Office and the improvement in fiscal 
management.   
                                                 
2
 Buettner and Kauder (2010) in their study on revenue forecasting performance of 12 OECD countries 
in the 1996-2008 period, also conclude that the GDP forecast error exerts a strong effect on the error of 
revenue forecasts. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief 
account of the fiscal performance of Greece in comparison to its euro area 
partners over the last fifteen years. Section 3 tries to detect the main reasons for 
the very poor performance of the political system regarding the control of fiscal 
deficits within the rules-based fiscal framework provided by the Stability and 
Growth Pact. In section 4 we make some proposals that could improve the 
domestic institutional and legal framework for conducting fiscal policy, and 
analyze in more detail the idea for a parliamentary budget office. In the last 
section we summarize the main findings of our analysis. 
 
2. A short story of Greek public finances since 1999 
It is rather generally agreed that a root-cause of the ongoing Greek fiscal crisis 
was not only the soaring public deficit in the last couple of years, but also the 
opacity of public accounts. Revisions in the size of the deficit and debt were a 
particularly common phenomenon since 2004, when the then newly elected 
government changed retroactively the rules for recording defense expenditure.  
In October 2009, following a change in government, the budget deficit 
announced for 2009 was far larger than anticipated.3 As a result Greece 
suffered a sharp erosion of credibility and financial markets reacted with a huge 
increase in the spreads of the Greek government bonds that made borrowing by 
                                                 
3
 More precisely, the 2009 general government deficit notified by the Greek government to Eurostat 
was revised from 3.7% of GDP in April 2009 to 6.0% of GDP on October 2nd 2009. The new 
government, elected in October 2009, notified a deficit of 12.5% of GDP on 21st October 2009. This 
figure has been upwards revised three more times since then.  
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the Greek state impossible. A short story of Greek public finances over the last 
fifteen years allows one to draw some rather revealing conclusions regarding 
the effects on budgetary outcomes of the weak fiscal governance framework 
within which fiscal policy was set.  
During the 1993-1999 period, Greek public finances were set on an ambitious 
fiscal adjustment path in an effort to comply with the relevant Maastricht 
criteria and enter the Eurozone. Indeed, the budget deficit, which stood at 
almost 13% of GDP in 1993, was reduced to below 3% by 19994, while the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio started declining.  At the same time, the Greek 
economy attained impressive growth rates, among the highest within European 
Union countries.  
In the period after the introduction of the euro, fiscal consolidation efforts lost 
momentum in almost all euro zone countries, despite the fact that the Stability 
and Growth Pact envisaged the attainment of balanced budgets over the 
medium term. In fact, the period 2001-2003 witnessed significant increases in 
budget deficits, as shown in Figure 1. In many countries, the general 
government deficit breached the 3% of GDP limit, and as a result these 
countries were subjected to the Excessive Deficit Procedure, as envisaged in 
the framework set by the Stability and Growth Pact. The same was the case 
with Greece in 2004. 
                                                 
4
 This figure was revised to 3.1% after a fiscal audit that took place in 2004. 
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Figure 1. Annual changes in the general government balance (% of GDP), 2000-2009 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission (2010), General Government Data, Part 
II: Tables by series, Spring 2010.  
 
The governments of these countries adopted fiscal consolidation packages 
which brought the deficit below the 3% limit and managed to bring the EDP to 
an end (see Figure 1). In the case of Greece, in June 2007 the Council of the 
European Union, based on the European Commission’s recommendation that 
the public deficit had been brought below the 3% to GDP reference value in a 
sustainable way, decided that the excessive deficit had been corrected and 
brought the excessive deficit procedure to an end.  Nevertheless, by the end of 
2007, the general government deficit had once more surpassed the 3% limit. 
The eruption of the global financial crisis in mid-September 2008 and the 
subsequent worldwide economic recession had a marked negative impact on 
the fiscal positions of euro area countries (Figure 1). In 2009 all euro area 
countries recorded deficits which, with the exception of Finland and 
Luxembourg, exceeded 3% of GDP. Public deficits rose as a result of both 
declining revenues and large public spending packages aimed at supporting 
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domestic consumption and the financial sector (for an overview, see van Riet, 
2010). Nevertheless, blaming the world financial turmoil for the recent 
explosion of fiscal deficits in Greece would be rather misleading (see Bank of 
Greece, 2009 and Rapanos and Kaplanoglou, 2011). For example, the banking 
system in Greece maintained sound capital positions throughout the crisis, 
while any present bank liquidity problems are the result rather than the cause of 
the unsustainable fiscal position of the public sector. 
 
3. Greek fiscal governance and budgetary outcomes 
Despite the fact that the Greek economy attained high growth rates throughout 
the last decade, fiscal imbalances were never effectively brought under control. 
One can find many explanations for high deficits. In the first instant, one could 
draw attention to the incompetence of the government to control expenditures 
and to collect budgeted revenues. The most fundamental reason, however, has 
been the weak institutional framework of budgeting and tax administration. A 
basic weakness of the Greek fiscal system is the poor mechanism of setting up 
the budget, and the lack of any systematic monitoring of its implementation. 
While the Parliament has a powerful constitutional role in voting the state 
budget, not only as a whole but also by Ministry, it does not have any kind of 
mechanism to follow up on the budget execution, and to monitor developments 
on public expenditures and revenues. 
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 It would be rather revealing to give a retrospective account of the budget data 
presented to the Parliament and approved by it over the last decade. Every 
November the Parliament examines the Introductory Report of the State Budget 
for the following year and is asked to approve it. Information for local 
government, public hospitals and social security funds finances appears only in 
a fragmentary manner and is largely missing. During the course of the 
following year, the only information regarding the developments on the 
execution of the budget is presented to the Parliament in October or November 
of the budget year (already too late to address any deviations). The Parliament 
is finally asked to approve of the final outcome of the budget in November of 
the year following the budget year. Just to take an example, the 2007 State 
Budget is approved by the Parliament in November 2006, its implementation 
progress is approved in November 2007 and its final outcome is approved in 
November 2008. Therefore, there appear to be large gaps in the flow of 
information regarding the execution of the budget, thus rendering the 
monitoring role of the Parliament ineffective.  
Had deviations from the targets not been large, the problem would perhaps not 
have been important. However, apparently that was not the case. How had 
major fiscal components of the state budget (total revenues, primary 
expenditure and interest payments) evolved one year after the approval by the 
Parliament of the respective targets? As Figures 2a and 2b show, not 
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particularly well, with deviations varying from year to year5. Smaller 
deviations and even positive surprises coincide with the periods of fiscal 
consolidation episodes imposed by the European fiscal framework, as 
described in the previous section.  On the whole, however, total revenues and 
primary expenditure were not evolving according to plan. In most years, there 
were significant shortfalls in revenues and serious expenditure overruns. 
 
Figure 2a. Deviations of within-year estimated of major fiscal aggregates from the 
targets set at the Introductory Report of the State Budget, 1999-2008 (excluding 
“outlier” 2009) 
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5
 Despite the fact that deviations from targets were usually rather high almost all years, they appear 
condensed once the exceptionally high revenue shortfalls of 2009 are added. Therefore, we present the 
data both including and excluding the “outlier” year 2009. 
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Figure 2b. Deviations of within-year estimated of major fiscal aggregates from the 
targets set at the Introductory Report of the State Budget, 1999-2009 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy and Finance, Introductory Report of the 
State Budget, Athens (various issues).  
 
More notably, the Parliament apparently could not impose any corrective action 
in the cases where the targets for revenue and expenditure were evidently going 
to be missed. The final outcome instead exhibited a further deterioration. 
Figure 3 presents the deviations of within-year estimates of the same fiscal 
aggregates from the final outcomes. Deviations from both the revenue and the 
expenditure targets expand further. 
  12 
Figure 3. Deviations of within-year estimates of major fiscal aggregates from final 
outcomes 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy and Finance, Introductory Report of the 
State Budget, Athens (various issues).  
 
Figure 4 presents the size of the average percentage deviations of final 
outcomes from the targets set in the budget over the 2001-2009 period. The 
within-year estimates presented to the Parliament indicated that revenues were 
falling short of the budgeted amount by 3.8%, while primary expenditure was 
going to exceed the targeted amount by 2.4% and interest payments by 1%. The 
final outcome drew an even bleaker picture, with revenue shortfalls reaching 
over 6% and expenditure overruns having further increased. The deviations of 
revenues and expenditures in percentage terms might not strike too large, but 
when fed into the State Budget deficit, they imply that the final figure for the 
  13 
state budget deficit stood every year on average 67% higher than the budgeted 
amount.  
Figure 4.  Percentage deviations of major fiscal aggregates of the State Budget     
(average 2001-2009) 
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An inherent inconsistency of the Greek budgeting system stems from the 
unbalanced power of the Parliament over the state budget vis-à-vis general 
government data. The Stability and Growth Pact, which sets the framework for 
conducting fiscal policy at the EU level, requires fiscal aggregates to be 
reported at a general government level respecting the accounting rules set in 
the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA 95). State budget 
data have, therefore, to be adjusted to a national accounts basis and be 
aggregated with data covering local authorities, social security funds and 
hospitals. The approval of fiscal forecasts included in the Stability and Growth 
Programs submitted to the European Commission is simply a responsibility of 
  14 
the Ministry of Finance, therefore the Parliament is rarely presented with such 
data, let alone asked to monitor them. 
The even greater lack of monitoring at a national level of the targets set for the 
general government balance and its components goes, not surprisingly, hand in 
hand with even higher deviations. Figure 5 has been constructed in a similar 
way with Figure 2. It compares the targets set at various updates of the Hellenic 
Stability and Growth Programme for the revenues, primary expenditure and 
interest payments at a general government level. When we move from the state 
to the general government level, deviations appear slightly lower in absolute 
amounts in the case of revenue shortfalls, but almost three times higher in the 
case of primary expenditure overruns. The relative improvement in the 
performance of revenue once we move to the general government level is 
primarily attributed to the considerable surpluses recorded every year by social 
security funds, an issue that has attracted the attention of Eurostat more than 
once.6 One could argue that from 2004 onwards Greek fiscal data have been 
revised many times (see European Commission, 8.1.2010 Report) and such ex 
post revisions could not have been possibly anticipated by Greek governments. 
Figure 6 presents similar information with Figure 5, excluding the effect of ex 
post revisions of general government revenue and expenditure data. Deviations 
from targets now appear much smaller in the case of government expenditure, 
                                                 
6
 Regarding the size and revisions of the surpluses of social security funds and the explanations 
provided by the Greek authorities, the European Commission notes in it’s latest report on Greek 
statistics that “it does not find these explanations sufficient and will carry out in the coming months a 
thorough investigation of the process of calculation by the Greek authorities of the surplus/deficit of the 
social security sector” (European Commission, 2010a). 
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which is to be expected since most revisions referred to the methodology in 
recording expenditure items (e.g. military expenditure).  
Figure 5. Deviations of final outcomes of major fiscal aggregates from targets set at the 
Hellenic Stability and Growth Programmes 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy and Finance, Update of the Hellenic 
Stability and Growth Programme, Athens (various issues), and European Commission (2010), General 
Government Data, Part II: Tables by series, Spring 2010. 
  
One fact can be established with hardly any doubt: on the whole fiscal targets 
were systematically being missed by a wide margin. A natural question arises: 
is there something intrinsically flawed in the way fiscal targets were set either 
at the state or at the general government level? A view widely held among both 
national and international organizations is that the problem can be traced to the 
fact that the government consistently based its fiscal forecasts on an overly 
optimistic outlook for the economy as a whole, thus inflating government 
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revenue forecasts and underestimating expenditure.  In other words, GDP 
growth was being overestimated and subsequently, when the harsh face of 
reality revealed itself, public revenue and expenditure targets were being 
missed. Despite its popularity, this view can be challenged rather easily. 
Figure 6. Deviations of final outcomes of major fiscal aggregates from the targets set at 
the Hellenic Stability and Growth Programmes (excluding the impact of ex-post 
statistical revisions) 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy and Finance, Update of the Hellenic 
Stability and Growth Programme, Athens (various issues), and European Commission (2010), General 
Government Data, Part II: Tables by series, Spring 2010. 
 
Referring to the period 2000-2009, the first column of Figure 7 shows the 
average deviation of the forecast for the real growth rate adopted by the 
Stability and Growth Programme for the following year from the final 
outcome. It appears that Greek governments do tended to overestimate real 
GDP growth, yet by a rather small margin of 0.35 percentage points.  The 
European Commission, as part of the monitoring of the finances of member 
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states, conducts biannual forecasts (each spring and autumn) for major 
economic aggregates. As becomes evident from Figure 7, the within-year 
forecasts for GDP growth were rather conservative, marginally underestimating 
the Greek GDP growth rate. The magnitude of the underestimation halves in 
the autumn forecast as the calendar year approaches its end. 
Figure 7. Deviations of GDP growth rate (2000 – 2009) 
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Forecasts for the general government balance convey an entirely different 
picture (Figure 8). The targets set in the Stability and Growth Programmes 
were highly unrealistic and therefore unreliable, since they were missed by a 
large margin (on average the annual deficit was 4.6% of GDP higher than the 
target). More surprisingly, the prudency of European Commission GDP 
forecasts does not translate into analogous prudency when it comes to public 
deficit. The EC forecasts appear to highly underestimate public deficits, even in 
the autumn forecasts, just one month before the end of the year in question.    
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Figure 8. Deviations of General Government balance from final data (% of GDP), 2000 - 
2009 
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 Part of the deviations can be attributed to the fact that Greek fiscal deficits 
were subject to multiple ex-post statistical revisions, which of course the 
government or other institutions such as the EC could not foresee. If we take 
these revisions into account,7 the performance of forecasts certainly improves, 
but still falls short of what could be expected (see Figure 9). The spring 
forecasts underestimated fiscal deficit on average by almost 2pp of GDP, while 
the autumn forecast still underestimated deficits by more than 0.5% of GDP. 
Figures 7-9 also present the spring and autumn forecasts for GDP and fiscal 
deficit of two other international organizations (the OECD and the IMF). These 
forecasts are similar to those of the European Commission, i.e. prudent on GDP 
and seriously underestimating fiscal deficits, with IMF forecasts being the most 
                                                 
7
 Revisions are defined as the differences between the final outcome of each year and the figure 
appearing as the first provisional estimate (in the EDP of March the following year). 
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unreliable (partly owing to the fact that they are conducted slightly earlier than 
those of the other two international organizations).  
Figure 9. Deviations of General Government balance from final data (% of GDP), 
excluding the impact of ex-post statistical revisions, 2000 – 2009 
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One could argue that the suboptimal recording of fiscal data for the general 
government and the weak monitoring of the budget execution made it difficult 
for EU or other international institutions to establish precise signaling 
mechanisms. In order to proceed to a thorough quantitative and qualitative 
assessment of the fiscal situation in question, credible and timely data should 
have been available, which was definitely not the case for Greece. 
Nevertheless, recurring forecast errors should have acted as warnings that 
something was going wrong, for example that some model parameters (e.g. 
revenue elasticities) were perhaps inaccurate. Revenue developments in excess 
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of what GDP growth would imply should not have been incorporated in official 
forecasts unless accompanied by specific policy measures. On the whole, 
stricter scrutiny of fiscal data and forecasts and an effort to embed past forecast 
errors into the assessment procedure would have certainly enhanced the 
effectiveness of international signaling mechanisms, especially those of the EU. 
The major conclusions one can draw from this short analysis are rather clear. 
Budget balance targets in Greece were being missed, while on the whole 
revenue shortfalls and expenditure overruns appear to be equally responsible 
for missing these targets. Despite the fact that the Greek constitution envisages 
a powerful role for the Parliament in the approval of the State budget, in 
practice the Parliament had little information and, therefore, power to monitor 
the execution of the budget it had approved.  At the same time, international 
organizations failed to effectively act as signaling mechanisms. The previous 
analysis has also demonstrated that the widely held view that optimistic 
assumptions on GDP growth are largely responsible for unrealistic forecasts for 
public revenue and expenditure is not accurate. Despite the fact that the 
economy did appear to grow in line with what the government (and other 
international organizations) had assumed, budgeted revenues did not find their 
way into the public purse, while expenditures (especially primary expenditures) 
were not kept under planned control. All these conclusions point to the same 
direction: the weak institutional framework for setting up and monitoring the 
execution of the budget is the fundamental reason for the weak fiscal 
performance and, therefore, any attempt to correct fiscal imbalances is rather 
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doomed to fail unless the reform of this framework is also given serious 
thought. The following section puts forward some ideas on possible ways of 
improving this institutional framework.  
 
4. Improving the domestic fiscal framework in Greece: some 
proposals 
A detailed analysis of the ways in which the institutional framework for setting, 
executing and evaluating the budget should be reformed is perhaps beyond the 
scope of the present paper.8 We will, however, attempt to lay out some key 
dimensions of such reform in the areas of budgetary procedures, tax 
administration and also regarding the possible role of an independent fiscal 
council. 
4.1. Budgeting procedures 
The issue of poor budget management in Greece is neither neglected nor newly 
discovered. There is indeed a long series of studies identifying the key aspects 
of this issue and proposing ways for reform, see for example HM Treasury 
(2002), Diamond et al (2005), IMF (2006), Rapanos (2007), Hawkesworth et al 
(2008), OECD (2010), Vraniali (2010). A very brief outline of the main 
                                                 
8
 For a recent review of several aspects of public financial management and budgeting, see Shah (2007) 
and, more specifically on Greece, see Rapanos (2007), Vraniali (2010) and OECD (2010). 
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weaknesses of the budgeting framework in Greece can be summarized as 
follows9: 
 Lack of transparency. The drafting of two separate budgets (the ordinary 
and the investment budget) with overlapping expenditure categories, the 
existence of significant off-budget operations, the lack of coherent reporting 
of the finances of general government bodies not included in the central 
government (i.e. local authorities, social security funds and hospitals), are 
the main elements introducing confusion and ambiguity regarding fiscal 
aggregates and impede any meaningful breakdown of these aggregates. 
 Lack of a medium-term budgetary framework. The budget drafted each 
November concerns the following calendar year. Although the approval of 
an annual budget involves important decisions on budgetary policy and is a 
key step, most fiscal measures have budgetary implications that go well 
beyond the yearly budgetary cycle. Therefore, a single year perspective 
provides a poor basis for fiscal planning. The government did submit every 
December an update of the Stability and Growth Programme with a three-
year horizon. Such updates, however, were usually not submitted to 
Parliament, while fiscal targets set for the medium-term were not binding. 
They were drafted in order to meet the obligations set in the Stability and 
Growth Pact, but did not reflect in a reliable way the strategic goals and 
objectives of the government. 
                                                 
9
 For more detailed comprehensive reviews, see Rapanos (2007) and Vraniali (2010). 
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 No program budgeting. International practice has shown that public funds 
are more effectively used in the framework of a program budgeting system 
with a focus on policy objectives, which addresses the quality of 
expenditure, reviews program results and addresses value for money. In the 
Greek case, the expenditure control and accountability framework is 
characterized by excessive and overlapping ex ante controls and ex post 
multiple expenditure controls inclined towards compliance and legality 
(Vraniali, 2010). Furthermore, input budgeting in the framework of an 
extremely detailed budget structure makes the budget inflexible and results 
in thousands of budget adjustments per year (OECD, 2010).10 
 Weak top-down budgeting process and lack of real accountability. The 
Greek budget preparation is to a large extent a bottom up exercise. Line 
ministries enjoy a large degree of freedom to propose their spending wishes 
with little early guidance from higher levels of government. They have little 
incentives to think in terms of reallocation and prioritizing instead of asking 
for additional funds. In the present system, the Ministry of Finance 
interferes at all stages of the budget process at a very detailed level, thus 
eliminating any sense of ownership of the line ministries budget, attenuating 
their accountability and removing any incentive for improvement in the 
management of public funds.  
 Organisational weaknesses. The General Accounting Office, which is 
entrusted to monitor the execution of the Ordinary (but not the Investment) 
                                                 
10
 In 2007, for example, there were 6,650 budget adjustment decisions, which regarded reallocations of 
expenditures (OECD, 2010). 
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Budget, has no coherent information system that will enable it to have an 
overview of total public revenues and expenditures at any point in time. 
Local information systems managed by e.g. local fiscal audit offices or  
different bodies of the central or general government are not on-line with 
the General Accounting Office, thus making the collection of information 
on both the revenue and the expenditure side a hard task. 
The directions of desired reform are rather self evident, if the above weakness 
of the Greek budgetary framework are set against the main features of a system 
of sound budgetary procedures identified by, for example, the European 
Commission (2009a) and briefly outlined in Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2011). 
The list of budgeting reform recommendations is indeed long and has been 
analysed in detail by other authors (e.g. OECD, 2010, Rapanos, 2007, Vraniali, 
2010), but its main elements can be summarized as follows: 
1. Consolidate budgeting procedures by merging the ordinary and the public 
investment budgets and placing them under the auspices of the General 
Accounting Office. The latter should be given more autonomy, with a 
permanent undersecretary as its head.  
2. Introduce a new accounting system compatible with the International Public 
Accounting Standards for all bodies of the general government. 
3. Improve the timeliness and reliability of budget execution reports. There 
should be full computerization of all transactions, while all offices of public 
expenditures should be connected on line. The General Accounting Office 
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should draft and make available monthly reports monitoring all 
expenditures of central government, local authorities and public entities. 
4. Introduce a new effective internal auditing system, but also use external 
auditors. Audits should not be limited to checking formal compliance with 
procedures, but should also address the quality of expenditure, make 
performance assessment, or even assess risks in terms of “sustainability”. 
The French case of Cour des comptes could serve as a useful point of 
reference (Lefas, 2010). 
5. Introduce stronger top-down budgeting. As OECD (2010) notes, a more 
top-down process, where early decision is taken on overall expenditure 
which is then subdivided into ministerial ceilings has shown to be more 
effective in constraining costs and making the line ministry feel ownership 
for fiscal decisions within the ministry. In this context, line ministry 
autonomy and accountability should be strengthened, while the primary 
responsibility for budget execution should be transferred to spending units. 
6. Introduce program budgeting. More focus should be given to policy 
objectives and more attention should be paid to the quality of public 
expenditure and the results of public expenditure programs (for a 
comprehensive review of program and performance budgeting, see OECD, 
2002 and 2007b). 
7. Introduce national fiscal rules, incorporated in law, which should be open, 
transparent and comprehensive of all fiscal activity of the public sector. 
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Greece could benefit from the international experience on the 
implementation of national fiscal rules. 
8. Introduce a medium term fiscal framework, incorporating multiyear 
estimates (e.g. on a three-year horizon) which reflect the strategic goals and 
objectives of the government. Such estimates could serve as the basis for 
top-down budget ceilings. 
9. Consider the introduction of “accruals accounting”. Such a system could 
enhance transparency in the allocation of public funds and the impact of 
commitments, and improve the decision making progress (Blöndal, 2003). 
Cash accounting practices need not, however, be removed, as they serve as 
a necessary basis for the operating, investing and financing activities of the 
government (Vraniali, 2010). 
In recent years, there have been some attempts to address some of the 
weaknesses listed above. The Introductory Report for the 2007 Budget, for 
example, attempted to introduce a unified expenditure classification system 
covering both the ordinary and the investment budget (see Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, 2007). Beginning with the 2008 Budget, the Greek 
government launched reforms to its public financial management, through e.g. 
establishing a Government Budget Reform Unit with the aim of introducing 
initially at a pilot basis a results-oriented program budgeting system.  
Perhaps the most wide-ranging attempt to reform public financial management 
in Greece has been Law 3871/2010 on “Fiscal Management and 
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Responsibility”, which was voted in August 2010. A detailed description and 
evaluation of the new provisions are perhaps beyond the scope of the present 
paper, but it is worth mentioning a few points of key importance. The new Law 
introduces a medium-term budgetary framework for the general government to 
be approved by the Parliament. This framework includes detailed fiscal targets, 
a clear reference of the macroeconomic assumptions on which fiscal forecasts 
are based, sensitivity analysis of fiscal targets, identifications of main upside 
risks, etc.  A top-down approach is introduced for public expenditure, since 
ceilings for all levels of general government (and also by Ministry) will be 
included in the budget on a three-year horizon. All bodies of the central 
government, local authorities and social security organizations (including 
hospitals) are required to draft annual budgets and communicate to the General 
Accounting Office on a monthly basis reports including data on expenditures, 
revenue, financing and liabilities, on a cash basis. The General Accounting 
Office is required to submit to Parliament and make available to the press 
consolidated reports at a general government level covering public revenue, 
expenditure, liabilities and financing on a monthly, quarterly and biannual 
basis. In this way, the execution of the general government budget will be 
closely and transparently monitored. Internal audit procedures for public 
expenditures are specified in detail and a double-entry accounting system is 
introduced for the central administration. A unified expenditure classification 
system is introduced for all levels of government and the scope for expenditure 
reallocations is seriously limited. Important amendments to the approved 
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budget (e.g. if public borrowing requirements exceed the budget forecast by 
more than 10%) have to be approved by the Parliament, after the Minister of 
Finance has submitted a Complementary Budget.  
The scope of the proposed reforms to the Greek budgeting framework is indeed 
ambitious and the extent to which they will transform the quality of fiscal 
governance remains to be seen in practice. However, close scrutiny allows one 
to identify some areas of potential concern. International experience has shown 
that national fiscal rules (e.g. expenditure rules, balanced-budget rules for 
certain levels of general government, etc.) can play an important disciplining 
role. No such rules are introduced. Furthermore, the medium term plan has to 
be submitted to Parliament by mid-April and be approved by mid-May. In case 
the Minister of Finance realizes that the assumptions or forecasts of the plan 
have changed by September, he has the right to submit to Parliament an update 
of the medium term plan, which will be more in line with the annual budget to 
be approved for the next year. If we also take into account the obligation of the 
Greek government to submit an update of the Stability and Growth Programme 
to the European Commission every December, one starts wondering about the 
degree of commitment to and binding power of “rolling” medium-term targets. 
Given the mounting level of public debt, one would expect draconian measures 
to be introduced regarding public borrowing procedures for all levels of general 
government. The new Law indeed envisages such procedures regarding the 
financing of the State budget (i.e. central government). The discretion left to 
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other levels of general government (for example local authorities) regarding 
both levels of borrowing and borrowing procedures is inexplicably large and 
rather worrying.11 
One of the apparent intended aims of the new Law is to introduce accruals 
accounting. In general, reporting on an accruals basis implies that revenues are 
recorded when they are “earned” (verified), while expenditures are recorded 
when they are incurred. Several developed countries (e.g. the United States, 
France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand) have opted for such an accounting 
system for their government accounts, with a view of making the cost of 
government action and the impact of commitments more transparent and to 
improve the decision making process (Blöndal, 2003, Khan and Mayes, 2009). 
In the Greek case, a kind of accruals accounting is introduced for public 
revenues, since the budget of a certain year will include revenues verified 
within this year or verified, but not cashed, in the previous year. Strict accruals 
accounting would not allow the transfer of the latter kind of revenues. In case 
verified revenues are not cashed within the budget year, the possibility is open 
for negative surprises at the end of the year regarding the size of the budget 
deficit. Furthermore, one cannot see why accruals accounting is not introduced 
for public expenditure as well.  
Despite the above points of criticism, the importance of the Law 3871 should 
not be underestimated. It could be the starting point of a radical reform in 
                                                 
11
 The Minister of Interior Decentralization and E-Government announced in late January 2011 that a 
series of measures will be endorsed for containing local government debt, once the recording of the 
financial position of municipalities has been finalized by end February 2011. 
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public financial management in Greece. Whether this will indeed be the case 
depends on a number of factors. As international experience shows, any 
reforms in fiscal governance are foremost political processes, and not just 
technical ones. They have to be based on realistic timescales, need country 
ownership and political commitment and, most importantly, they should be in 
line with a country’s historical, political and social heritage. 
 
4.2. Tax reform and tax administration 
The large revenue shortfalls identified in section 3 can at least partly be 
attributed to the poor performance of tax administration mechanisms in Greece 
and the related problem of widespread tax evasion.12 Most Greek governments, 
in the recent past, have acknowledged this issue and announced their firm 
intention to address it, mainly through adopting new pieces of legislation that 
would supposedly enhance revenue collection and intensify tax controls. The 
numerous tax reforms introduced year by year involved mainly changes of tax 
bases and tax rates, while the structural weaknesses of the tax and tax 
administration systems remained intact. 
The recent fiscal crisis spurred renewed interest in the aim of containing tax 
evasion, as an effective way of raising tax revenue and spreading the costs of 
fiscal adjustment fairly. Over the last months, the government has announced a 
series of measures involving increases in tax rates on the one hand, and ways of 
                                                 
12
 For a recent attempt to estimate its extent, see Mylonas et al (2010). 
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combating tax evasion on the other, including intensified tax controls and 
lifting bank secrecy. In general the adopted measures aiming at the containment 
of tax evasion are in the right direction, but a more ambitious approach is 
necessary in order to address the weaknesses of the institutional framework of 
the tax system and tax administration mechanism.13  
The importance of tax administration in the proper functioning of any tax 
system has long been recognized. The main mandate of tax administration 
mechanisms is the enforcement of tax laws, which are indeed extensive in their 
range and nature, involve many persons and businesses and result in the 
collection of a vast bulk of revenues needed to support the state (Crandall, 
2010). In this respect, the effectiveness, efficiency, fairness and impartiality of 
revenue collection mechanisms are key ingredients of a good tax system. In 
Bird’s (2004) terms, effectiveness requires establishing an environment in 
which citizens are induced to comply with tax laws voluntarily, while 
efficiency requires that this task be performed at minimum cost to the 
community. 
As perhaps expected, there is no single set of prescriptions that, once 
introduced, will automatically ensure improved tax administration in any 
country. Nevertheless, certain aspects seem to characterize good tax 
administration systems (Bird, 2004 and 2008). First, a tax administration must 
have adequate resources in terms of manpower, infrastructure and an 
                                                 
13
 For a recent insightful view on the weaknesses and ways of improving the tax administration 
mechanism in Greece, see Bank of Greece (2010), pp. 170-181. 
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appropriate organizational structure. Second, a tax administration needs an 
information system to ascertain the existing and potential tax base, including 
the collection of information from potential taxpayers themselves, from third 
parties, and from internal sources of the tax administration through an internal 
communication system. Third, a tax administration needs a system of penalties 
for non-complying taxpayers, where the structure, severity and coverage of 
penalties are carefully planned, and perhaps also a system of rewards for 
complying taxpayers. Fourth, a tax administration must select strategies and set 
out administrative rules to counter each type of non-compliance by different 
groups of taxpayers. Finally, since no tax administration is flawless, provision 
must be made to redress mistakes, aiming at both redressing taxpayer 
grievances (appeals, administrative remedies, ombudsmen), and identifying and 
correct (or prevent) errors by the tax administration (internal reviews, 
inspection and anti-corruption). 
Based on this set of principles and also taking into account international 
experience, as well as the features of the Greek reality, an approach aimed at 
improving tax administration in Greece could indicatively (though not 
exhaustively) include the following:14 
1. Reorganising and consolidating tax administration offices and appointing 
members of staff on the basis of meritocracy and not party affiliation 
criteria. Giving more autonomy to tax administration by, e.g. appointing a 
                                                 
14
 For a more detailed analysis, see Rapanos and Kaplanoglou (forthcoming). 
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permanent undersecretary as its head with a term of office exceeding the 
electoral cycle could enhance its effectiveness.15 
2. Simplifying and rationalizing the entire tax system. It is not possible to 
address issues of enhancing the efficiency of tax administration without 
taking into account both the degree of complexity of the tax structure and 
the extent to which this structure remains stable over time.16 Tax provisions 
are currently scattered in numerous pieces of legislation, complicating the 
task of tax auditors and tax payers alike. Tax provisions should be encoded 
in one body that the Ministry of Finance would upload and continuously 
update on its website. 
3. Radically changing the tax audit system. Tax audits should be organized on 
the basis of centralized controls that identify individuals or enterprises with 
high risk of evasion. This method should replace the current enormous 
discretion of individual tax officers which creates incentives for corruption.  
4. Stopping resort to “tax amnesties”. In theory a tax amnesty could be 
effective if it is given to wipe off old offences in order to launch a new era 
of tough tax enforcement. International evidence shows that repeated tax 
amnesties generally signal that the government is unable to enforce taxes 
effectively. Such policies have been proved common in Greece whenever 
revenue receipts fell short of targets, have worked clearly for the benefit of 
those who evade taxes and have created strong incentives for tax evasion. 
                                                 
15
 There are several studies on the various aspects of autonomy in tax administration and on the 
international experience regarding the ways to improve the effectiveness of tax administration, see e.g. 
Crandall (2010), Kidd and Crandall (2006), Kidd (2010).  
16
 Complexity and its implications for tax administration has long been an issue of concern in many 
developed countries, see for example IRS (1988).  
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5. Creating an effective dispute resolution mechanism, so that resort to tax 
courts becomes the last solution. 
6. Improving the efficiency of the judicial system. Currently revenues worth 
millions of Euros are blocked in courts for several years until decisions are 
taken. Tax courts should make decisions in a speedier manner. 
7. Aligning tax audit practices with those of other OECD countries for the 
purpose of tackling new forms of tax evasion in a globalised setting. 
Reforming tax administration is not a short-term exercise, and quickly 
increasing the tax take through more vigorous collection efforts does not 
guarantee sustainable improvement.17  Improving tax administration is rather a 
long-term game of building up adequate domestic institutional capacity, while 
the chances of success rest with a number of factors, such as a clear recognition 
at high political levels of the importance of this task and the cultivation of a 
higher level of trust between the citizens and the government.  The latter could 
certainly be reinforced in the case of Greece, if taxpayers were viewed by the 
tax authorities as “clients”, who are not necessarily willing ones but whose 
needs must be met, and not simply thieves to be caught. Last but not least, such 
trust could be gained if the soundness and perceived fairness of public 
expenditures that tax revenues finance also increased. 
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 The example of Argentina is particularly interesting, where better tax administration increased 
revenues markedly (from 13 to 23 percent of GDP over the 1989-92 period. However, this increase was 
not sustained over time since political pressures soon offset the increase in the tax ratio (Martinez-
Vasquez, 2001). 
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4.3. The Greek Parliamentary Budget Office: can it be a success story? 
Another element of a domestic fiscal framework that could be conducive to 
fiscal discipline is the establishment of non-partisan public bodies acting in the 
field of budgetary policy. In fact, the idea of independent fiscal councils acting 
as “national watchdogs” has started gaining ground as a way of institutionally 
strengthening domestic fiscal frameworks (see van Riet, 2010 and European 
Commission, 2009b). The successful delegation of monetary policy to 
independent central banks led some authors to propose the setting-up of 
independent fiscal policy councils (Eichengreen et al, 1999, Calmfors, 2003, 
Wyplosz, 2002, 2005). The delegation of fiscal policy to an independent 
council does pose a number of serious problems (Wyplosz, 2008, Debrun et al, 
2009), but in practice independent fiscal councils have been established in a 
growing number of countries, perhaps the most recent example being the 
formation of the UK Office for Budget Responsibility last May. The precise 
mandate of such councils varies considerably across countries (see European 
Commission, 2009b), yet none is responsible for the conduct of fiscal policy.  
More specifically, most independent fiscal councils in operation today perform, 
at least, three core functions. First, they produce independent economic 
forecasts, on which forecasts on fiscal aggregates are based. In fact, in some 
countries (for example Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium), the 
macroeconomic forecasts produced by fiscal councils are binding for the 
government’s budget planning process. Second, they analyse and assess the 
forecasts on public revenue and expenditure, and highlight possible risks of 
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deviation from the targets set by the government itself in the budget (Calmfors, 
2010a, Chote et al, 2010). Third, they monitor the budget implementation 
process throughout the year, and provide relevant information and statistical 
data at regular intervals. 
The precise scope and type of activities vary among countries, depending on 
each country’s institutional framework, historical evolution, challenges to be 
met and, not least, on the resources and personnel devoted to the council. Such 
activities may include, for example, the assessment of policies over a short- and 
medium- term horizon, the examination of the long-run sustainability of public 
finances, institutional analysis of specific sectors, cost-benefit analysis of 
public infrastructure projects, etc.  
Just to cite a few examples, the oldest fiscal council is the Central Planning 
Bureau (CPB) in the Netherlands, which has provided governments and 
political parties with independent opinions and analyses since 1945. It employs 
around 150 staff members and has a really broad scope of activities. Its reports 
and studies are widely accepted and constitute points of reference in public 
debates. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the US is an independent 
authority that reports to US Congress. It has the highest number of staff 
members (around 235) and its primary objective is to provide the Congress 
Members with quantitative and qualitative information regarding proposed 
policies. In the case of Belgium, the country’s transformation into a federal 
state raised concerns that budgetary stability would be jeopardized due to lack 
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of coordination among the various levels of government. The Belgian fiscal 
council (the High Council of Finance), in addition to its other activities, plays 
an important coordinating role, setting medium-term targets for the budget of 
the central government and of the regions. In Chile, the role of the independent 
advisory committee (ACRCP) is to provide, among other things, forecasts on 
the potential level of world copper prices, which determine a sizable part of 
public revenues. 
Similar councils have been recently established in other counties as well, e.g. 
Sweden, Hungary and Canada, while the most recent example is the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) in the UK, which was formed in May 2010 with 
the mandate to make independent assessments of the public finances and the 
economy. 
Through the above functions, an independent fiscal council aims to safeguard a 
high level of economic policy discussion by ensuring that policies are 
explained and motivated in a proper way and that they are based on sound 
analytical foundations. It contributes to fiscal transparency and accountability, 
strengthens democratic control and raises the political cost of “bad policies” in 
terms of credibility of the policymakers. 
However, the setting-up of an independent fiscal authority does not 
automatically imply that its role will be played effectively. The experience of 
countries where such councils do act effectively shows that establishing and 
maintaining an independent research unit that provides objective budgetary 
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information and exerts peer pressure in the formation of fiscal policies is an 
important challenge. It seems that certain fundamental characteristics must be 
present in order for the council to be successful. 
 Foremost is its independence from the government, all political parties and any 
pressure groups, that is its nonpartisan character. As Anderson (2009) stresses, 
“’nonpartisan’ is much different from ‘bipartisan’: the former connotes lack of 
political affiliation; the latter connotes affiliation with both (or all) political 
parties.” It is, therefore, of critical importance the members of the independent 
fiscal council to be appointed on the basis of their merit and professional 
capability, and not in a way that satisfies the political parties that will be called 
to appoint these members, in an effort to seek a bipartisan equilibrium. If the 
composition of the independent fiscal council turns out to be the result of a 
political compromise, its effectiveness and credibility will be seriously 
undermined from the very outset (Rapanos, 2010). To cite a recent example, 
the appointment of Robert Chote as the new Chair of the Office for Budget 
Responsibility in the UK in October 2010 was justified on the grounds that “he 
is very well qualified professionally for the post, having demonstrated his 
independence of mind and expertise during his time at the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies” (UK Parliament, 2010). In order to further enhance the independence 
of the PBO, one of its members could be a public finance expert from abroad, 
as is the case with e.g. the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council. Another parameter 
that contributes to the actual independence of a fiscal council relates to the 
duration of its members’ mandate. It is advisable for this duration to exceed the 
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government’s term of office. In several countries it has been set to 5 years, and 
council members can only be replaced in case of a serious breach of their 
duties.  Their dates of appointment could be different, so as for their terms not 
to expire simultaneously.  
A further issue relates to where the fiscal council is accountable to and its 
sources of financing. The practice followed in other countries is not universal. 
In some countries (e.g. the US and Canada) the council reports to parliament 
(Congress); in others it operates under the Ministry of Finance (e.g. the 
Netherlands, Chile); while in certain others it reports to government (Sweden) 
or is a totally independent authority. In the case of countries with powerful 
single-party governments that enjoy absolute control over budget preparation 
and implementation, placing the independent fiscal council under the auspices 
of the parliament is a rather appropriate choice (see Anderson, 2009, Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2010). As regards the financing of the council, in other countries this is 
usually covered by government or parliament funds, while a small fraction is 
offered by the private sector. Financing an authority with funds from the 
government, the policies of which this authority is called to transparently and 
objectively assess, could potentially be a problem. In practise, however, 
reducing the funds available to the council as a result of its criticism is rarely 
attempted since it entails a huge political cost for the government, exactly 
because such actions are widely publicised.  
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A connected issue relates to the recruitment of specialised and properly trained 
personnel for the council. The number of people supporting the work of fiscal 
councils varies significantly across countries, from 4 people in Sweden to 
roughly 250 people in the US (CBO), and the scope of activities these councils 
can undertake is of course conditional on that number. Regardless of their 
precise number, strong professional leadership and high quality analytical staff 
are a key aspect (Rivlin, 2010).  
A final issue of critical importance for a fiscal council to gain credibility for its 
assessments is to make all of its reports and analyses available to the public and 
the press, and try hard to make them clear and readable to all. Enhancing the 
transparency in the conduct of fiscal policy is possible, only when information 
is disseminated, accessible and understandable to all, and not just to a small 
number of technocrats or to the members of parliament. This has been the case 
with all active independent fiscal councils, which have managed to build up the 
reputation of providing reliable assessments, and of being truly independent 
and unbiased. 
Perhaps the best blueprint for an effective independent fiscal council is given 
by Alice Rivlin, the first director of the Congressional Budget Office of the 
U.S.. She eloquently identifies four aspects on which the acceptance of CBO by 
the political players rests (Rivlin, 2010): 
1. It has had strong professional leadership and attracted high quality 
analytical staff. 
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2. It has been aggressively non-partisan and never allowed politicians to 
appoint members of staff. 
3. It never makes recommendations on policy matters, but offers estimates of 
budgetary costs or analysis of options and alternatives. It has always tried to 
help politicians evaluate their choices and steadfastly refused to tell them 
how to choose. 
4. It makes all of its reports and analyses available to the public and the press 
and tries hard to make them clear and readable. 
In Greece, in July 2010, the government submitted to Parliament a Draft Bill, 
which envisages the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office under the 
aegis of the Parliament. Establishing such an office is with little doubt a move 
in the right direction. What Greece lacks today is credibility, not only in its 
fiscal policy but also in the quality of its fiscal data. Rebuilding confidence is a 
long process and the Parliamentary Budget Office could play the role of a 
catalyst in this process. But what are its chances of doing so?18 
According to the legal provisions, the Greek Parliamentary Budget Office 
administratively belongs to the Secretary General of the Parliament and 
submits its reports to the Special Standing Committee responsible for 
examining the Financial Statement and the General Balance Sheet of the 
State.19 Its mandate is defined rather generally as “collecting information on the 
State Budget, classifying it in a systematic way, and providing general support 
                                                 
18
 For a review of the rationale for setting up and the possible role of a Parliamentary Budget Office in 
the Greek context, see Rapanos and Kaplanoglou (2010). 
19
 This committee is a sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on Economic Affairs. 
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to the Parliament work”. The Ministry of Finance and other government 
agencies are required to provide all necessary data. The Parliament is 
responsible for financing the Office, which will be staffed by 10 members in 
total with university or high school education. 
Financing the parliamentary budget office with funds from the Parliament’s 
own budget (approved only by the Parliament itself and not by the Ministry of 
Finance) and placing it under the auspices of the Parliament are right choices in 
the case of Greece, because the legislature can now potentially be on a more 
equal footing with the executive branch. 
However, the prospects for this office to effectively fulfil its intended goals are 
not favourable. First of all, its mandate appears rather poor and imprecise. Most 
importantly, the key requirement for wide publicity of the office’s reports is not 
met. If the office’s reports are accessible only to Members of Parliament, the 
amount of peer pressure to the executive branch does not increase, and hence 
fiscal transparency is not enhanced. The structure of the office is not clear, 
neither is the way the staff members will be appointed, while the impression is 
given that high professional skills, experience and competence, are not an 
evident requirement. Terms of appointment are not specified and the non-
partisan character of the Office’s leadership is also under question. Evaluating 
the design of the Greek PBO in terms of Rivlin’s four points, one feels that it 
does not score high in any single one of them.   
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The above criticism is not meant to imply that the Office is doomed to fail. The 
legal provisions for the creation of the Office do allow sufficient flexibility, for 
its effectiveness to be enhanced. The choice of a chairman with high 
professional qualification and independence of mind, the recruitment of 
competent staff, the specification of the core functions to be performed along 
the lines described earlier and the accessibility by all to the Office’s analyses 
are profoundly issues of critical importance. All these, however, remain to be 
seen in practice. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The activist fiscal policies in response to the recent financial crisis and the deep 
recession, and the serious fiscal imbalances now facing many countries, 
including those of the euro area, suggest that the mechanisms for ensuring 
fiscal discipline face new challenges. A broad consensus has emerged that the 
domestic institutional settings of a country are of primary importance for the 
conduct of sound fiscal policies, since such settings create the environment, the 
incentives and the constraints under which fiscal policy decisions are taken. 
Thus, recent discussion on fiscal governance has focused on precisely how 
domestic fiscal frameworks can be institutionally strengthened.  
Greece is a prime example of how poor fiscal governance, if combined with 
other negative factors such as the instability of global financial markets, can 
indeed lead an economy to the brink of financial collapse and at the same time 
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create a systemic problem for a common-currency area as a whole. In the case 
of Greece, as well as of quite a few other European countries, primary public 
deficits and a high level of public debt are likely to persist for a long period of 
time. So is the skepticism of world financial markets and, thus, an even distant 
threat of default. In such an environment, the adoption of fiscal consolidation 
packages that will reduce the size of the public deficit is simply inadequate, 
unless institutional mechanisms that will enhance commitment to credible, 
sustainable and growth-enhancing long-run fiscal plans are also put in place. 
As our research has shown for Greece, the accumulation of public deficits 
appears to have been a choice of governments, rather than the unfortunate 
result of macroeconomic conditions turning out less favourably than expected. 
At the same time, there were no mechanisms in place, either internal or 
external, that would effectively pinpoint the systematic deviations of public 
revenues and expenditures from the targets set, and act on their containment. In 
this respect, the fundamental reason underlying poor fiscal performance in 
Greece has been weak fiscal institutions and inadequate public financial 
management. Thus, unless serious effort is directed towards increasing the 
effectiveness of such institutions and in strengthening public financial 
management at all levels of government, Greece runs the danger of seeing the 
fruits of the very painful fiscal effort undertaken being wasted once the severity 
of the present situation has been hopefully overcome in a few years time. 
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The news is not all bad. There is a growing accumulation of both theoretical 
studies and practical experience of countries around the world which have 
faced in the past or are currently facing similar challenges. The importance of 
certain elements of sound fiscal governance like national fiscal rules or well 
structured budgetary procedures, seems to have been established beyond much 
doubt. The optimal balance between different forms of fiscal restraints, e.g. 
rules versus fiscal councils, is still a matter of ongoing debate (see Krogstrup 
and Wyplosz, 2007, and Debrun and Kumar, 2007, Hagemann, 2010, Calmfors, 
2010b), and as perhaps expected a “one size fits all” approach is an unavailable 
luxury. Furthermore, Greece appears to be in such an embryonic stage 
regarding almost all aspects of fiscal governance, that the potential gains to be 
yielded from a serious reform of the national fiscal framework along the lines 
proposed in this paper are indeed large. Such gains do not simply refer to the 
arithmetic reduction of the fiscal deficit, but range from promoting a fair 
distribution of the tax burden through the effective tackling of tax evasion to 
enhancing economic growth through addressing issues of the quality of public 
finances. 
The need for reforming public financial management in Greece seems to have 
been realized by Greek authorities and to have been highly prioritized by the 
international organizations surveilling the Greek economy. The first steps have 
been done, but a lot more is still under question and remains to be seen in 
practice. Over the longer run, effective budget procedures do not necessarily 
assure sound policies, unless they reflect a broader political will for fiscal 
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discipline. Many countries in the past have engaged in the modernization of 
their budget systems, yet seem to lack fiscal discipline. Therefore, improving 
budget procedures is not sufficient on its own to alleviate deeply rooted 
problems. 
As Pretorius and Pretorius (2008) note, the successful implementation of such 
institutional reforms requires high-level political commitment and public 
support.   From a political economy perspective, Greece’s record on both has 
been particularly low in the past. Under the present situation political 
commitment is at least in the medium term strengthened by the commitments 
the government has undertaken vis-à-vis the three international organizations, 
but is an open bet after these organizations will stop their surveillance. 
Regarding public support, in our view it can be built up only if the public is 
convinced that the burden of fiscal adjustment will be spread fairly and that this 
adjustment will not seriously hamper the growth prospects of the economy and 
destroy social cohesion. 
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